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Healthy democracies require civic engagement (e.g., voting) from their citizens.
Past research has suggested that civic engagement is positively associated with
self-transcendence values of care and concern for the welfare of others, and negatively
associated with self-enhancement values of self-interest, dominance, and personal
success. However, research has yet to address whether people’s perceptions of others’
values are related to civic engagement. Across three studies with nationally representative
samples in the UK and US (Ns ≥ 1,000), we explored how civic engagement relates
to (a) perceptions of national values, (b) perceptions of the values of one’s typical
compatriot, and (c) perceptions of the values encouraged by social and cultural
institutions. Study 1 showed that the tendency for British citizens to perceive British
culture as valuing self-transcendence was associated with an increased likelihood of
voting in the 2015 general election. These findings were replicated for “a typical British
person” (Study 2) and “a typical American person” (Study 3); Studies 2 and 3 also
found that perceived self-enhancement values of typical compatriots were negatively
correlated with reported voting. We also examined how perceptions of others’ values
relate to cultural estrangement—the feeling of not fitting in one’s culture or of being
atypical. Like civic engagement, those who perceived less self-transcendence and more
self-enhancement in their culture felt more culturally estranged. Mediation analyses
in Studies 2 and 3 revealed that estrangement helped to explain the relationship
between perceptions of others’ values and voting. In sum, the extent to which Brits and
Americans perceive that self-transcendence values are strongly held by other citizens is
associated with feeling less estranged and with reports of being more civically engaged.
In contrast, the perception that these targets hold or promote self-enhancement values is
positively associated with feelings of estrangement, to the detriment of civic engagement.
Implications for future research and democratic processes are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
“Americans today continue to have a lot in common and share
many values, beliefs, and attitudes. Yet most Americans do not feel
this way; most perceive a crisis of values.” Baker (2005, p. 110)
“Here I am the barbarian, because I am not understood by
anyone.” Rousseau (1751, p. 1)
The experience of not belonging, of looking in disbelief at
one’s compatriots and wondering whether there can be common
ground, may be familiar to UK and US citizens in the contentious
run-ups to and aftermaths of the 2016 EU referendum and the
2016 Trump-Clinton presidential race. During such significant
votes, public discourse often turns to the topics of values and
national identity. Questions like “Why are other people voting for
this?” and “What does our nation really care about right now?”
are frequently asked. As Baker’s and Rousseau’s quotations above
suggest, people tend to have ideas about what their compatriots
value. The purpose of the present research is to examine whether
these perceptions of others’ values bear any relations to whether
people feel they belong in their culture and whether they turn up
at the polls to vote or engage in other forms of civic participation.
In so doing, this research provides a novel glimpse into how
perceptions of others’ values relate to civic engagement. Much
has been written on how civic engagement relates to personal
values (Schwartz, 2010; Pacheco and Owen, 2015; Vecchione
et al., 2015), but not, to our knowledge, on how it connects
to perceptions of others’ values. In addition to exploring the
relationship between perceptions of others’ values and civic
engagement, we also explore the possibility that this relationship
is mediated by cultural estrangement, a variable that past research
has related to discrepancies between personal and societal values
(Bernard et al., 2006) and to civic engagement (Hackett and
Omoto, 2009).
We draw on the well-known theory of values developed by
Schwartz (1992, 1994), which proposes a set of values that are
likely to be universal because they derive from three broad
requirements of human existence: People’s needs to function
as biological organisms, to take part in coordinated social
interaction, and to look after the survival and welfare of their
groups. Schwartz’s values theory yields a set of higher-order
values, two of which, self-transcendence and self-enhancement,
have been shown in previous research to have particularly clear
and consistent relationships with a wide range of social and
environmental outcomes (Strauss et al., 2008; Crompton, 2010;
Sagiv et al., 2011).
The self-transcendence/self-enhancement axis captures a
conflict between opposing motivations: The self-transcendence
values of care and concern for the welfare and interests of
one’s community and other people more generally, vs. the
self-enhancement values of self-interest, personal success and
dominance over others (Schwartz, 2012, p. 8). The theory holds
that when self-transcendence values are held strongly by an
individual at a particular moment, then it is likely, due to
their motivational opposition, that self-enhancement values (and
value-congruent behaviors) are temporarily suppressed (Maio
et al., 2009). Such a “see-saw” action works in the opposite
direction as well.
While all people are likely to care about both self-
transcendence and self-enhancement values to some degree
(Bardi and Schwartz, 2003), the relative priority people place on
them is an important correlate of civic outcomes. Compared to
focusing on self-enhancement values, valuing self-transcendence
at high levels (and self-enhancement at low levels) is associated
with relatively less prejudice, more acceptance of diversity
(Strauss et al., 2008), more co-operation rather than competition
(Sagiv et al., 2011), and more adoption of environmentally
sustainable behaviors (Karp, 1996).
Civic engagement behaviors may be understood as “individual
and collective actions designed to identify and address issues
of public concern” (APA, 2016).1 Although the relationship
between personal values and particular civic attitudes and
behaviors will depend to some extent on political ideology (Boer
and Fischer, 2013)–participating in a far right rally will be driven
by different values than volunteering at a refugee camp, for
instance, just as voting for a conservative candidate will be
driven by different values than voting for a liberal candidate—
there is also evidence that personally-held self-transcendence and
self-enhancement values are relevant to broad classes of civic
engagement activities. Several studies have found that, regardless
of political identification, self-transcendence correlates positively,
while self-enhancement correlates negatively, with activities
such as participating in political demonstrations, contacting
politicians, and signing petitions (Schwartz, 2010; Vecchione
et al., 2015); participating in organizations to promote the welfare
of people, animals, and the environment (Schwartz, 2010);
helping others (Daniel et al., 2015); and volunteering locally
(Sanderson and McQuilkin, 2017).
What about people’s decision to not engage in civic matters, to
not even use their right to cast a vote?
Over the last few decades, governments in both the UK
and US have struggled with historically low voter turnout.
For instance, Fink (2012) found that political participation fell
further in the UK over the period 2002–2010 than in most
other EU countries. Although there is scant research on the link
between voter abstention and personal values, one study has
noted that non-voters tended to be especially self-enhancement
focused in their values (Caprara et al., 2012). In contrast,
voters give comparatively high priority to values in the self-
transcendence domain.
Given the established links between personal values and levels
of civic engagement, it seems sensible to ask how people’s beliefs
about others’ values relate to their civic engagement. When
people decide to vote, campaign, or attend a public meeting, they
are engaging with other citizens to influence civic outcomes as
expressions of group values. The values perceived to be held by
other people, therefore, are likely to bear some relation to an
individual’s decision to take part in civic life.
For example, if people believe that their neighbors generally
prioritize self-transcendence values, then perhaps that belief acts
1American Psychological Association (2016). Available online at http://www.apa.
org/education/undergrad/civic-engagement.aspx
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in a number of ways as an incentive to show up to the polls. It
could give people confidence that it is good to act in service of
the group and to be able to report to others that one did the right
thing; it might also give rise to thoughts like “If others care, then
so should I.” If, on the other hand, people think their neighbors
are motivated by self-enhancement, then perhaps this suppresses
the desire to participate in matters of group concern. It could
give people confidence that acting for group concern is a sucker’s
proposition, or, perhaps, give rise to thoughts like “Well everyone
else is just out for themselves, so why should I bother?”
If, as Miller (1999) has argued, people in Western societies
hold a norm of self-interest, then individuals might both
assume that others are motivated to pursue their material
self-interest and also acquiesce to that perceived, prevailing
norm, i.e., adopt attitudes and enact behaviors consistent
with the norm of self-interest. A perceived norm of self-
interest might suppress civic engagement to the extent that
such engagement is seen as primarily a group- (rather than
self-) interested activity. A perceived norm of group-interest,
on the other hand, might seem more congruent with civic
activities, thereby encouraging individuals to acquiesce to
perceived norms of engagement and become more involved. The
influences of norms on behavior have been widely demonstrated
(Cialdini et al., 1991); for example, interventions that involve
giving information about the norms of a peer group can
change drinking habits and environmentally-friendly behaviors
(see Miller and Prentice, 2016).
The few studies that have examined perceptions of others’
values have tended to focus on value stereotypes and the
extent to which caricatures of a group’s values are accurate
or not. Dobewall and Strack (2011), for instance, found that
various ethnic groups in Estonian society perceived all groups,
including their own, as prioritizing self-enhancement values to
a much greater degree than was actually reflected by European
Social Survey data. Similarly, Brits assumed their compatriots
were relatively lower on self-transcendence and higher on self-
enhancement than was actually the case (Bernard et al., 2006),
and Russian participants reported believing “typical Russians” to
be more self-enhancement oriented than they were themselves
(Lönnqvist et al., 2012). A common conclusion emerges from
this small literature: People often perceive value differences
between themselves and their compatriots, typically such that
their compatriots are believed to be more self-enhancement
oriented than they are themselves.
Having observed these (mis)perceptions in several cultures,
we wondered whether they have any systematic relations to civic
engagement behaviors. Some evidence supports the idea that
people’s behavior may be affected by the assumptions they have
about other people’s values.
For instance, one study found that perceptions of the
values of out-group members relate to out-group antagonism
or altruism: In a resource allocation task, both German and
Israeli participants allocated more resources to their “out-group”
(Israelis and Germans, respectively), the more they perceived
them to value self-transcendence (Schwartz et al., 1990). In
another study, participants were presented with the Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game, but it was named either the “Wall Street
Game” or the “Community Game” (Liberman et al., 2004). Wall
Street Game players were consistently more likely to betray the
other players and attempt to win the highest reward compared
to those who played the Community Game, who were more
likely to cooperate. The authors suggested that the name of the
game affected people’s expectations regarding how others would
play, which then changed how they themselves played. If these
processes also occur at the civic level, then citizens living in
what they believe to be a caring and co-operative environment
(i.e., where others prioritize self-transcendence values) could be
more likely to participate in a caring and cooperative way than
those who believe they exist in a self-interested environment (i.e.,
where others prioritize self-enhancement values).
These reflections led us to formulate our first two hypotheses.
H1a &H1b: Civic engagement will be (a) positively correlated
with perceptions that other people value self-transcendence and
(b) negatively correlated with perceptions that other people
value self-enhancement.
Following the results of studies on perceived value
discrepancy, we also expect that perceptions of values may be
associated with cultural estrangement. The word estrangement
comes from the Latin verb extraneare, to treat as a stranger.
Thus, people who experience estrangement feel like a stranger
to the people or society around them. Estrangement is typically
understood specifically as the rejection of, or removal from,
the dominant values in society (Cozzarelli and Karafa, 1998).
It has been situated as a vital component within alienation
(Bernard et al., 2006, p. 78), a broader construct studied deeply
in sociology and philosophy that concerns a more multi-faceted
dissociation than merely from society’s values (e.g., from the
production of goods).
Bernard et al. (2006) showed that people felt more estranged
the more of a discrepancy there was between their personal
values and the ratings of those same values in British society.
Estrangement was particularly high amongst people who felt
like society cared less about the welfare of others than they
did personally.
Such results lead us to the reasoning that cultural
estrangement may be driven by beliefs about others’ values
per se. Self-enhancement values are by definition self-oriented
rather than group-oriented, so it is plausible that believing that
other people prioritize selfish goals generates feelings of not
fitting in and not being included in other people’s concerns,
whatever one’s own value priorities. We reasoned that, in
contrast, believing one’s welfare is included in others’ spheres
of concern (even via mere citizenship) would be negatively
associated with the subjective experience of being estranged. We
therefore formulated these next two hypotheses.
H2a and H2b: Cultural estrangement will be (a) negatively
correlated with perceptions that others value self-transcendence
and (b) positively correlated with perceptions that others
value self-enhancement.
While there is very little research on the relationship between
cultural estrangement and political engagement, some evidence
suggests that it is negative. Hackett and Omoto (2009) found
that estrangement after an election was significantly higher
in non-voters than in voters; it was also associated with low
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political efficacy (i.e., the belief that one has the competence
and skills to engage with politics) and low intention to become
politically engaged in future (e.g., to vote, to protest, to work in
the community). This finding corresponds with literature that
describes alienation as deriving, in part, from feelings of isolation
and being ineffective in the world (Stokols, 1975). We therefore
formed hypothesis H2c.
H2c: Cultural estrangement will be negatively correlated with
civic engagement.
We reasoned, given these hypotheses, that estrangement
might explain the association between perceptions of others’
values and civic engagement. If people believe their compatriots
to be selfish, for instance, it could be the corresponding feeling
of disconnection from dominant values that explains why they
choose not to get civically involved. Put in mediation analytical
terms, we hypothesize that perceptions of others’ values will be
related to estrangement (the a path in Baron and Kenny, 1986)
and civic engagement (the c path), that estrangement will be
related to civic engagement (the b path), and that estrangement
will explain (as the ab product) the relations between perception
of others’ values and civic engagement [the [reduced] c’ path].
H2d: Cultural estrangement will mediate the relationship
between perception of others’ values and civic engagement.
In addition to testing the hypotheses above, we sought to
explore how cultural estrangement and civic engagement might
relate to people’s perceptions of the values promoted by cultural
institutions. It is partly through having contact with the rules,
practices, and norms of institutions that people obtain a sense
of the values that are held to be important in their culture,
as well as the values that are encouraged in them as citizens
(Schwartz and Sagie, 2000).
Although the values of both institutions and other people
can be considered indicators of what society cares about, we
reasoned that institutions tend to be more reflective of the values
of prevailing ideologies, such as neoliberalism or capitalism,
that may go beyond more day-to-day concerns of oneself
and compatriots. The value priorities of citizens have been
shown to relate to the extent to which their country’s economy
is actually organized according to de-regulated, free-market
capitalist principles (Kasser et al., 2007; Kasser and Linn, 2016).
But do the values people think are enshrined in and promoted
by their institutions relate to civic (dis)engagement? To our
knowledge, such questions have not been studied.
Perhaps the most relevant literature to this question is
that concerning values in the workplace which has shown
that people who believe that their workplace values altruism
and relationships (similar to self-transcendence values: Ros
et al., 1999; Cable and Edwards, 2004) are more satisfied with
their job and have greater intention to stay than do those
who do not see such values as prioritized in the workplace
(Edwards and Cable, 2009).
Admittedly, it is a leap to infer that workplace dynamics
parallel those of large national institutions, but insofar as people
can attribute values to abstract entities (like companies) and
engage differently depending on these attributions, a similar
pattern might hold in the civic sphere. If that is so, we expect
that the pattern of relations between perceptions of institutional
values and civic engagement will be similar to the pattern
of relations between perceptions of other people’s values and
civic engagement specified above, as institutions also play a
role in signaling what values are important in society and how
individuals should therefore behave.
H3a and H3b: Civic engagement will be (a) positively
associated with how much people perceive institutions to
encourage self-transcendence and (b) negatively associated with
how much people perceive institutions to encourage self-
enhancement.
Finally, we explored whether perceptions of institutional
values would relate to cultural estrangement. If cultural
estrangement entails the experience of feeling separate from
culture, and people look to institutions to get a sense of cultural
values, then we imagine, for the reasons stated above (H2a),
that the perceived encouragement of self-transcendence might
correlate with lower estrangement, while self-enhancement
might correlate with higher estrangement.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
We conducted three studies that examine the relations among
perceived values for self-transcendence and self-enhancement
and how much people are civically engaged, have positive
attitudes about civic engagement, and report feeling estranged
from their cultures. Study 1 asked British residents to report
on the values essential to being British (i.e., “what it means
to be British”) and whether they voted in recent elections.
Next, representative samples of Brits (Study 2) and Americans
(Study 3) reported on the values of a “typical Brit/American”
and whether they (a) voted in local and national elections, (b)
participated in other (non-voting) forms of civic engagement
(like signing petitions), (c) held positive attitudes about civic
engagement, and d) felt culturally estranged. In addition,
participants in Studies 2 and 3 indicated the extent to which they
believed various cultural institutions, like the government and
the media, promoted self-transcendence and self-enhancement.
Readers might expect that we tested our main hypotheses after
controlling for ratings of personally- held self-enhancement and
self-transcendence values. We did not do so, however. Please
refer to Appendix for our reasons.
STUDY 1
Material and Methods
Participants
One thousand seven hundred and sixty-two participants (51.1%
women, 48.9% men; 18–91 years of age, Mage = 48.42,
SD= 16.56; 88.1%White British; 80.3% born in theUK) took part
in an online survey administered bymarket research organization
YouGov in Spring of 2015. Participants took∼12min on average
to complete the survey and received credits from YouGov
that they could exchange for shopping vouchers or money.
Participants who did not complete all measures were excluded
from relevant analyses, leaving a maximum N = 1,045.
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Procedure
After giving their informed consent to take part in the study,
participants were asked to indicate their age, gender, ethnicity,
gross household income, country of birth, and which political
party they identified with. Next, participants answered the
question “To what extent do you consider yourself as British?”
on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely), with additional
options to answer ‘don’t know’ or to skip the question. To
measure participants’ perception of which values are important
in British culture, they were asked “Now we’d like you to think
about British culture and identity. To what extent do you agree or
disagree that the following statements summarize an important
part of what it means to be British: Pursuing authority, wealth,
ambition, and influence” (an indicator of self-enhancement); a
similarly worded question replaced these value elements with
“Valuing equality and peace, being honest and friendly” (an
indicator of self-transcendence). Participants were also presented
with three statements about their feelings about being British,
as these were all candidate correlates of voting behavior: “I feel
good about being British,” “I feel alienated from British culture,”
and “I care about the welfare of Britain.” In response to all five
statements, participants indicated how strongly they agree from 1
(strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), with the options to answer
‘don’t know’ or to skip the question. Responses to these five
questions were re-coded prior to analysis so that higher scores
indicated feeling better about being British, believing Brits valued
pursuing authority, wealth, ambition, and influence, etc.
Approximately 3 weeks later, within 3 days of the General
Election, participants were asked “Talking to people about the
General Election on May 7th, we have found that a lot of people
didn’t manage to vote. How about you? Did you manage to
vote in the General Election?”2 Participants answered with ‘yes’
(59.9%), ‘no’ (5.6%), or ‘don’t know’ (0.3%), or did not respond
at follow up (34.2%). Responses of ‘don’t know’ were set to
missing along with non-responses. Attrition analysis revealed,
importantly, that perceived values did not predict responding
vs. not responding (ps > 0.05). Demographics were explored
as predictors of attrition, revealing negligible effects of age and
household income, bs < 0.04, ps < 0.05. If participants answered
yes to voting, they indicated which political party they had voted
for, with the largest proportions going to Conservative (19.8%)
and Labor (16.6%).
Results
Our first hypothesis was that voting (i.e., our measure of
civic engagement) would be positively related to believing
that being British meant valuing self-transcendence and would
be negatively related to believing that being British meant
valuing self-enhancement. Analyses revealed that perceived self-
transcendence values in British culture were positively related to
voting, rST = 0.095, p = 0.002, but perceived self-enhancement
values in British culture were not, rSE = −0.003, p = 0.930. As
2The voting question was written this way because social desirability might point
one toward responding that “Yes I did my civic duty and voted” even if that were
untrue. The phrasing employed was designed to lessen that social press in the hopes
of obtaining more honest responses of non-voters.
shown in Table 1, all of the “British feelings” were significantly
related to voting in the previous election. Further, all of the
feelings were related to perceived self-transcendence in the
predicted manner, but only feeling good about being British was
related to self-enhancement (positively).
Together, the correlational patterns suggested that all of
the British feelings are candidate mediators that could help to
explain the observed link between perceived self-transcendence
values of others and voting. To examine this possibility, we
conducted mediation analyses using Hayes’ Process procedure
(model 4, 5,000 bootstraps; Hayes, 2013). All models were
logistic to appropriately model the yes/no voting variable. We
conducted a series of analyses with one of the feelings entered
at a time. The analysis with feeling good about being British
revealed that feeling good was no longer a significant predictor
of voting once perception of others’ self-transcendence values
was added to the model (b = 0.136, SE = 0.121, z(1044) = 1.12,
p = 0.261), and thus feeling good about being British was not
a mediator of the relationship. In contrast, caring about Britain
retained a significant effect on voting, b = 0.360, SE = 0.147,
z(1044) = 2.45, p = 0.014, and the CI for the indirect effect
did not contain zero, b = 0.075, SE = 0.031, [0.015, 0.139],
indicating mediation. Similarly, feeling alienated maintained a
marginally significant prediction of voting in the presence of
self-transcendence, b = −0.206, SE = 0.108, z(1044) = −1.917,
p = 0.055, and indirect effect analysis indicated that alienation
was a mediator, b = 0.064, SE = 0.034, [0.002, 0.134]. Across all
models, the perceived values maintained significant direct effects
on voting despite the presence of the mediators. Mediation tests
were not pursued for self-enhancement because it was not related
to voting.
Overall, these analyses indicate that the relationship between
participants’ voting behavior and their perceptions of self-
transcendence values in British culture is mediated by how much
participants reported caring about the welfare of Britain and how
little they feel alienated from British culture, but not by their
satisfaction with being British.
Brief Discussion
Study 1 provided initial support for the hypothesis that
perceptions of others’ self-transcendence values (in British
culture) are positively tied to civic engagement (voting in the
2015 election). Further, this demonstration was prospective in
that perceived values predicted subsequent voting behavior. Past
studies (Schwartz, 2010; Vecchione et al., 2015) have shown
that civic engagement is associated with one’s own values, but,
to our knowledge, Study 1’s results are the first indication that
perceptions of the content of others’ values may be another
important correlate of civic engagement. The current study also
provides support for hypotheses 2a-c: The more that people
perceived self-transcendence values to be prevalent among other
Brits, the less they felt alienated, and, in turn, the more they
reported voting. We did not find support, however, for the
hypothesis that perceived self-enhancement values of other
Brits would be negatively related to civic engagement, and
thus mediational hypothesis testing was not conducted for
this variable.
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TABLE 1 | Correlations and descriptive statistics for Study 1 variables.
Mean SD Voted Feel Good Alienated Welfare ST-Brit
Voted 0.92 0.26
Feel good 2.13 1.01 0.11***
Alienated 3.64 1.12 −0.11*** −0.42***
Welfare 1.63 0.70 0.13*** 0.34*** −0.22***
ST-Brit 2.87 1.07 0.16*** 0.36*** −0.25*** 0.28***
SE-Brit 2.08 0.97 0.00 0.19*** 0.02 0.04 0.06*
***p < 0.001, *p < 0.05. ST-Brit, Perceived importance of self-transcendence values for the “typical Brit.” SE-Brit, Perceived importance of self-enhancement values for the
“typical Brit.”
These results are of course preliminary and have (at least) one
strong methodological limitation: Each construct was measured
by a single item. It remains to be seen whether the present results
might replicate with more thorough construct assessment and
other measures of civic engagement.
Study 2 addresses each of these issues by employing
expanded measures of perceived values, cultural estrangement,
and civic engagement.
STUDY 2
Material and Methods
Participants
The sample was obtained in April 2015 by market research
organization Ipsos MORI, which collected a representative
sample of the British population in terms of age, gender, region
of the UK, level of education, and income. The sample obtained
had N = 1,000, 50% female. Age was binned by decade after
a grouping that included 18–24 year olds, and every decade
comprised at least 15% of the sample until 65–74 years and 75+
years. Participants received points for the Ipsos benefit system in
exchange for completing the survey.
Overview of Procedure
Participants first completed informed consent and were assured
of the confidentiality of their responses. Next, they completed
demographic questions and a measure of socially desirable
responding.3 Participants then completed a measure of values
three times, once concerning themselves, once concerning the
typical British citizen, and once concerning the values that they
believe social/cultural institutions encourage them to hold. The
order of the target rating (self, compatriot, and institution)
was randomized across participants. Further, participants were
3Specifically, participants completed the BIDR 6-Short (Bobbio and Manganelli,
2011), which has subscales for impression management (IM) and self-deceptive
enhancement (SDE). Only SDE was related to our key behavioral civic engagement
outcomes, and specifically only to voting (rUK = 0.17, rUS = 0.09) Across Studies
2 and 3, we saw only one instance in which social desirability reduced to statistical
non-significance an effect between values and engagement. Specifically, in Study 3,
when we partialled SDE from the correlations between perceived values of others
and voting, there was a negligible change in the correlation between perceived ST
of others and voting in the US (from r= .07, p= 0.024, to rpartial = 0.06, p= 0.063).
Because socially desirable responding had little impact on relations between values
and civic outcomes, we do not refer to this variable further.
randomly assigned to rate the values encouraged by one of
five randomly assigned institutional targets: the government,
the media, the education system, the business sector, and arts
and culture. Next, participants completed a measure of civic
engagement and then a measure of cultural estrangement.
Finally, they were debriefed.
Measures
Self-enhancement and self-transcendence
The Personal Values Questionnaire-21 (PVQ-21; Schwartz, 2003)
is a version of the PVQ-40 (Schwartz et al., 2001) shortened
for the European Social Survey.4 It presents participants with
21 brief descriptions of people who give importance to one of
the ten values in Schwartz’s (1992) model. For instance, the
description “It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have
a lot of money and expensive things” reflects the value of power.
Participants completed three versions of the PVQ, one for self,
one for compatriot-as-target, and one for institution-as-target.
The prompt for the self was:
Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description
and think about how much each person is or is not like YOU.
Select the box underneath that shows how much the person in the
description is or is not like YOU.
Participants indicated to what extent each person was like them
on a scale from 1 (not like me at all) to 6 (very much like me).
For the compatriot-as-target PVQ, the prompt replaced
“YOU” with “A TYPICAL BRITISH CITIZEN.” The scale was
anchored at 1 (not at all like a typical British citizen) and 6 (very
much like a typical British citizen).
The prompt for institutions varied by the institution cited.
For example, the prompt for the government institution
condition read:
We’d now like you to think about the GOVERNMENT in your
country. Please read each description and think whether the
GOVERNMENT in your country encourages you to be this kind of
person. By the GOVERNMENT we mean the local authorities and
the national and UK governments. Select the box underneath that
shows how much you think the GOVERNMENT encourages you to
be this kind of person.
4Available online at www.europeansocialsurvey.org
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The scale for institution-as-target was anchored at 1 (doesn’t
encourage me to be this kind of person at all) and 6 (very much
encourages me to be this kind of person).
The 10 value domain scores were first calculated as the mean
of their two constitutive items (or of their three items, in the
case of universalism). To investigate the relative importance of
the values and control for some response biases, we subtracted
the mean of all 21 PVQ items from the 10 value domain
scores (i.e., ipsatized the scores; cf. Schwartz, 2003). These
ipsatized domain scores were used in the computation of the
higher-order scores and all subsequent analyses. For example,
self-transcendence was the mean of the ipsative scores for
benevolence and universalism.
Multidimensional scaling visualizations revealed that the
compatriot and institution versions of the PVQ had a good
fit to Schwartz’s (1992) circumplex model of values for self-
reports. That is, items that belonged to the higher order
domains of self-transcendence and self-enhancement clustered
together for the compatriot and institution versions in ways
that would be expected from past analyses of the model
that are based on self-reports of one’s own values. Such
results are consistent with other research regarding informant
reports on the PVQ (e.g., in Polish samples, Skimina and
Cieciuch, 2017). Thus, we proceeded to create the self-
transcendence and self-enhancement scores for the compatriot
and institution formats with the averaging and ipsatizing
procedures described above.
Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that self and other
values should be treated as separate constructs rather than
attributed to the same latent construct. For example, for self-
transcendence values in the UK sample, a model with two
separate but covaried latent variables for the self and other
items fit better [RMSEA = 0.051 [0.043, 0.059], SRMR = 0.033,
CFI= 0.973, TLI= 0.965], than a single latent variable model for
both self and other self-transcendence items [RMSEA = 0.196
[0.187, 0.205], SRMR = 0.133, CFI = 0.662, TLI = 0.565].
The superiority of separate construct models held across
samples, value constructs, and combinations of self-, other-, and
institution-targeted items.
Civic engagement—attitudes
The Civic Attitudes subscale of the Civic Engagement Scale
(Doolittle and Faul, 2013) measures the feelings and beliefs
people have about taking responsibility for and trying to make
a difference in their community. Participants indicated their
agreement with six statements, including “I feel responsible for
my community” and “I believe that it is important to volunteer”
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Two
of the eight original items were dropped from the instrument
prior to data collection because members of the research team
suspected that they would not perform well in a British sample.5
The six remaining items had good internal reliability (α= 0.85).
5The items were: “I believe that I have a responsibility to help the poor and the
hungry,” and “I am committed to serve in my community.” To members of the
(primarily British) team, the phrase “the poor and the hungry” and the verb “serve”
in this context did not feel reflective of contemporary British parlance.
Civic engagement—behaviors
To measure civic engagement behaviors, we asked whether
participants had recently participated in 13 behaviors ranging
from voting in local and national elections to getting in
touch with government officials. These items were submitted
to exploratory factor analysis using MLE and promax rotation.
After dropping one poorly- and cross-loading item (about
“clicktivism”), we noted a clear elbow in the scree plot after the
second factor. The factors were interpretable in that one was
clearly represented by voting behavior (the two items for local
and national, mean standardized loading = 0.83) and the other
captured all the other forms of civic engagement behavior (mean
standardized loading = 0.51). We thus created two summary
variables, one for voting and one for other civic engagement
behaviors. Some civic engagement behaviors that constituted the
other forms measure were signing petitions, volunteering for
charities or campaigns, and donating money to organizations.
Cultural estrangement
The Cultural Estrangement Inventory (CEI, Cozzarelli and
Karafa, 1998) is a ten-item questionnaire with two subscales.
The “atypical” subscale measures the extent to which people
think their values, beliefs and ideas differ from those of their
compatriots (e.g., “I strongly identify with British values” reverse
scored), and the “misfit” subscale measures the extent to which
people feel like they do not fit in with the cultural mainstream
(e.g., “People, on occasion, tell me that I am different.”). The CEI
was developed for Americans, but it has previously been adapted
for British participants (e.g., by Bernard et al., 2006). Respondents
rated their agreement with each item on a 7-point Likert-type
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), and we
calculated two estrangement scores by averaging responses to the
items belonging to their respective subscales for atypical (5 items)
and misfit (5 items).
Results
Preliminary Analysis
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 2.
Examination of the means for the values of self-transcendence
and self-enhancement for self and for perceptions of others’
values suggests that people see themselves as more self-
transcendence oriented (self-other Cohen’s d = 0.72; Cohen,
1992) and less self-enhancement oriented (self-other Cohen’s
d =−0.68) than the typical British citizen.
Before turning to tests of our hypotheses, we note that, as
shown in Table 2, personally-held self-transcendence values
were positively and significantly related to both voting and other
(non-voting-related) forms of civic engagement. In contrast,
personally-held self-enhancement values were significantly
negatively correlated with both forms of engagement,
corroborating previous research on values and civic engagement
(Schwartz, 2010; Vecchione et al., 2015). Personally held values
correlated with cultural estrangement in the same directions that
perceived values of others and of institutions were expected to
correlate with estrangement.
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s alphas, and correlations for study 2 variables.
Mean SD Alpha Voting Natl.
Vote
Loc.
Vote
Oth
Civ Bx
CEA Atyp Misfit SE-Comp. ST-Comp. SE-Inst. ST-Inst. SE-Self
Voting 0.82 0.36 0.79
Natl Vote 0.83 0.39 – 0.87***
Loc Vote 0.82 0.40 – 0.87*** 0.61***
Oth Civ Bx 0.36 0.27 0.79 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.23***
CEA 3.52 0.64 0.85 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.50***
Atypical 3.50 0.63 0.80 −0.16*** −0.13*** −0.12*** −0.07* 0.24***
Misfit 2.64 0.79 0.82 −0.12*** −0.10** −0.10** 0.01 −0.09** 0.47***
SE-Comp. −0.15 0.68 0.78 −0.13*** −0.11*** −0.12*** −0.05 −0.10** 0.31*** 0.24***
ST-Comp. 0.03 0.56 0.85 0.11*** 0.10** 0.09** 0.06 0.12*** −0.28*** −0.23*** −0.69***
SE-Inst. −0.16 0.78 0.84 −0.05 −0.05 −0.06 0.02 −0.02 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.29*** −0.18***
ST-Inst. 0.15 0.64 0.91 0.03 0.03 0.04 −0.01 0.04 −0.17*** −0.18*** −0.21*** 0.25*** −0.74***
SE-Self −0.73 0.78 0.80 −0.14*** −0.13*** −0.12*** −0.08* −0.10** −0.05 0.10** 0.32*** −0.18*** 0.36*** −0.25***
ST-Self 0.57 0.63 0.81 0.09** 0.09** 0.06* 0.22*** 0.25*** −0.10** −0.02 −0.13*** 0.20*** −0.15*** 0.23*** −0.62***
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Voting mean of two voting items; Natl. Vote, voting in national election; Loc. Vote, voting in local election; Oth Civ Bx, other civic engagement
behaviors; CEA, Civic Engagement Attitudes; Atyp, atypical subscale of cultural estrangement; SE-Comp, self-enhancement; ST, self-transcendence; Comp, Compatriot (perceived
values of others); Inst, Institutions (perceived value encouragements).
Hypothesis Testing
Perceived values of others and civic engagement
(H1a and H1b)
Turning to our focal concern with the relationship between
perceived values of others and civic engagement, as shown
in Table 2, perceived others’ self-transcendence values were
positively linked to voting, replicating Study 1. In contrast
to Study 1, which found no link between perceptions of
others’ self-enhancement and voting, here we observed a
negative effect, in line with hypothesis 1b. We found a similar
effect for civic engagement attitudes, which were linked to
higher perceptions of others’ self-transcendence and lower
perceptions of others’ self-enhancement values. However, neither
measure of values related to engaging in other forms of
civic behavior.
Perceived values of others, cultural estrangement, and civic
engagement (H2a-H2d)
We also hypothesized that perceptions of others’ self-
transcendence would be negatively related to feelings of
cultural estrangement. This was the case, as the more that
people reported believing that their compatriots valued self-
transcendence, the less they reported feeling either atypical or
like a misfit. Conversely, the more that people believed others
valued self-enhancement, the more they reported feeling atypical
or a misfit. These results both support the expectations presented
in hypothesis 2a and help establish that the path from the
predictor to the proposed mediator is tenable.
Hypothesis 2b, which suggested that feelings of estrangement
would be negatively correlated with civic engagement, was
supported for all combinations of the atypical/misfit subscales
and for civic engagement, except between misfit and other (non-
voting) civic behaviors. In general, themore estranged people felt,
the less civic engagement they reported. These findings also help
establish the link between the proposed mediator and outcome.
We therefore next tested the mediation hypothesis (H2c) that
feeling estranged helps to explain the link between perceived
values of others and civic engagement. For this analysis, we
recognized that perceptions of both self-transcendence and
self-enhancement had associations with both the mediator(s)
and the outcome that were of approximately equal size but
opposite in direction, thereby satisfying a key assumption
behind the proper employment of a difference score (Edwards,
2002). Thus, we created a single score representing the relative
strength of perceived others’ self-transcendence values over self-
enhancement (ST-SE; for similar uses of relative value strength
indicators, see, e.g., Prentice and Sheldon, 2015). We tested a
model in which this ST-SE difference score was the predictor,
voting was the outcome, and atypical and misfit estrangement
were simultaneous mediators (Model 4; Hayes, 2013). Once the
mediators were entered into the model with perceived others’
values, the effect of the ST-SE difference score was reduced
from b = 0.041, SE = 0.001, t(994) = 4.10, p < 0.001, to
b = 0.025, SE = 0.010, t(994) = 2.42, p = 0.016. Of the aspects
of estrangement, only atypical was a significant predictor of
voting, b = −0.063, SE = 0.021, t(994) = −3.02, p = 0.003, and
bootstrapping the indirect effect indicated mediation by atypical,
b= 0.011 [0.004, 0.020], SE= 0.004.6
Institutional values, cultural estrangement, and civic
engagement (H3a and H3b)
Finally, we turned to our hypotheses that the values that people
believe are encouraged by cultural institutions are linked to
civic engagement and cultural estrangement. As seen in Table 2,
the zero-order correlations between both civic engagement
6These mediation analyses are subject to many of the same potential pitfalls we
outline in the Appendix if self and other values were to be treated simultaneously
in the same model, but differ, in part, in that they were hypothesized. We
therefore pursue the tests but discuss further under 5.4 Limitations and avenues
for further research.
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TABLE 3 | Test statistics from predicting cultural estrangement and civic
engagement behaviors and attitudes from perceived values encouraged by
institutions, institution types, and their interaction, Study 2.
F p
OTHER CIVIC ENGAGEMENT BEHAVIOR
Value 0.02 0.898
Institution 0.40 0.812
Value × Institution Type 2.74 0.027
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT ATTITUDES
Value 0.85 0.356
Institution 0.46 0.767
Value × Institution Type 1.88 0.111
VOTING
Value 3.22 0.073
Institution 0.49 0.746
Value × Institution Type 1.55 0.186
CULTURAL ESTRANGEMENT
Value 54.61 <0.001
Institution 0.63 0.642
Value × Institution Type 3.26 0.012
variables and perceived institutional self-transcendence or self-
enhancement (without regard for institution type) were small and
non-significant. However, these results may belie associations
that differ in direction across the five institutions we used as
targets. Thus, in separate analyses, we predicted civic engagement
and cultural estrangement from the ST-SE difference score,
institution type, and the interaction between these two variables.
The tests of the main effects and interactions are presented
in Table 3.
Here we highlight three key findings. First, perceiving
institutions to encourage self-transcendence over self-
enhancement was associated with lower estrangement. Second,
this effect on cultural estrangement was qualified by a significant
interaction between perceived institutional ST-SE values and
institution type. All effects were negative. The strongest effect
was within the government condition, b = −0.269, SE = 0.046,
t(889) = −5.78, p < 0.001, while the weakest effect was in the
media condition, b = −0.057, SE = 0.041, t(889) = −1.40,
p < 0.162 (see Figure 1). Third, there was also a perceived
institutional ST-SE × institution type interaction in the
prediction of other civic engagement behaviors. This interaction
appeared to be driven by the difference in slopes between the arts
and culture and the media conditions, as displayed in Figure 2.
To the extent that arts and culture institutions were perceived
to encourage ST over SE values, civic engagement increased,
b = 0.038, SE = 0.027, t(889) = 1.75, p = 0.080, but as media
institutions were perceived to encourage ST over SE values, civic
engagement decreased, b = 0.040, SE = 0.018, t(889) = −2.20,
p= 0.028.
In summary, the media’s and the government’s promotion
of relatively more self-enhancement over self-transcendence is
linked to more estrangement and less engagement, whereas the
promotion of self-transcendence over self-enhancement by arts
and culture is linked to greater engagement.
Brief Discussion
Study 2 replicates and extends Study 1 in several ways. First,
it provides further support for H1, that perceptions of others’
self-transcendence values, this time in relation to “a typical
British person,” are positively related to voting and a range
of civic engagement behaviors. Perceptions of others’ self-
enhancement values were also negatively related to voting
(unlike in Study 1) but were unrelated to civic engagement
behaviors other than voting (e.g., volunteering, donating money,
signing petitions). We obtained these findings with an extended
measure of Schwartz’s (1992, 1994) values, giving us more reliable
evidence in support of H1b than we had in Study 1, where
we used single-item measures of self-transcendence and self-
enhancement values.
Further, perceptions of others’ values were related to cultural
estrangement (H2a), and cultural estrangement was related to
civic engagement (H2b), with results for self-transcendence
and self-enhancement in the expected directions. Tests of
our mediation hypothesis (H2d) revealed that not only did
estrangement serve as a mediator of the relationship between
perceptions of others’ values and voting, but its explanatory
power was specific to the atypicality aspect of cultural
estrangement. Of the two subscales, misfit and atypicality, only
atypicality seems to be a fairly direct reflection of feeling that one’s
own values are (un)like others.
Both Studies 1 and 2 were conducted with large, nationally
representative British samples, but it remains to be seen whether
similar patterns of results would occur in another culture. For this
reason, we replicated the procedure and measures of Study 2 in a
third study, this time using a sample based in the US.
STUDY 3
Material and Methods
Participants
The sample was obtained in April 2015 by Ipsos MORI, which
collected a representative sample of the US population in terms
of age, gender, region of the US, level of education, and income.
The sample obtained had N = 1,005 and was 51.1% female. As
in Study 2, age was binned by decade after a grouping to include
18–24 year olds, and every decade from 25 to 64 comprised at
least 15% of the sample. Participants received points for the Ipsos
benefit system in exchange for completing the survey.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Study 2.
Measures
The measures were the same as those in Study 2, with some
differences in wording to reflect the American sample. Scale
descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations are provided
in Table 4.
The results of an exploratory factor analysis on the civic
engagement behavior items revealed a two-factor solution that
was quite like that found in the UK sample. We used the same
indicators as in Study 2 to create the same variables for voting
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FIGURE 1 | Relations between civic engagement attitudes (y axis) and the extent to which the institutions of Arts and Culture and Media are perceived to promote
relatively more self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement values (x axis) in the UK (A) and the US (B). Shaded regions reflect the 95% confidence regions around the
regression lines.
FIGURE 2 | Relations between other (non-voting) civic engagement behaviors (y axis) and the extent to which the institutions of Arts and Culture and Media are
perceived to promote relatively more self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement values (x axis) in the UK (A) and the US (B). Shaded regions reflect the 95% confidence
regions around the regression lines.
(mean standardized loading = 0.87) and other civic engagement
behaviors (mean standardized loading= 0.54).
The PVQ items for perceptions of compatriots and
institutions again showed good fit to a clustered circumplex, so
we again created the self-transcendence and self-enhancement
scores for the perceived compatriot and institution formats of
the questionnaires as in Study 2.
Results
Preliminary Analysis
As in the British sample in Study 2, Americans saw themselves
as more self-transcendence oriented (self-other Cohen’s
d = 0.72) and less self-enhancement oriented (self-other Cohen’s
d = −0.68) than the typical American citizen. Further, and
as in Study 2, personally-held self-transcendence values were
positively and significantly related to both voting and other
(non-voting-related) forms of civic engagement. In contrast,
personally-held self-enhancement values were significantly
negatively correlated with voting but were unrelated to other
forms of civic engagement (see Table 4).
Hypothesis Testing
Perceived values of others and civic engagement
(H1a and H1b)
As reported in Table 4 people’s perceptions of their compatriots’
self-transcendence values were positively correlated with voting,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 March 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 559
Sanderson et al. Value Perceptions and Civic Engagement
TABLE 4 | Descriptive statistics, Cronbach alphas, and correlations for study 3 variables.
Mean SD Alpha Voting Natl.
Vote
Loc.
Vote
Oth
Civ Bx
CEA Atyp Misfit SE-Comp. ST-Comp. SE-Inst. ST-Inst. SE-Self
Voting 0.75 0.41 0.87
Natl vote 0.78 0.43 – 0.92***
Loc vote 0.73 0.45 – 0.94*** 0.74***
Oth Civ Bx 0.33 0.28 0.83 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.33***
CEA 3.73 0.68 0.88 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.47***
Atypical 3.45 0.70 0.82 −0.16*** −0.15*** −0.16*** −0.10** −0.33***
Misfit 2.89 0.88 0.86 −0.19*** −0.19*** −0.17*** 0.02 0.01 −0.39***
SE-Comp. 0.20 0.82 0.85 −0.04 −0.01 −0.06* 0.04 −0.05 0.35*** 0.25***
ST-Comp. −0.17 0.65 0.87 0.07* 0.06 0.08* −0.03 0.06 −0.37*** −0.29*** −0.78***
SE-Inst. −0.12 0.88 0.83 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.09** 0.00 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.42*** −0.33***
ST-Inst. 0.15 0.70 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.04 0.04 −0.21*** −0.22*** −0.32*** 0.37*** −0.72***
SE-Self −0.78 0.78 0.79 −0.07* −0.04 −0.08* −0.02 −0.11*** 0.00 0.13*** 0.12*** −0.04 0.28*** −0.22***
ST-Self 0.59 0.60 0.83 0.10** 0.09** 0.10** 0.18*** 0.22*** −0.12*** −0.05 0.10** −0.06 −0.08* 0.18*** −0.59***
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Voting, mean of two voting items; Natl. Vote, voting in national election; Loc. Vote, voting in local election; Oth Civ Bx, other civic engagement
behaviors; CEA, Civic Engagement Attitudes; Atyp, atypical subscale of cultural estrangement; SE-Comp., Self-Enhancement; ST, self-transcendence; Comp, Compatriot (perceived
values of others); Inst., Institutions (perceived value encouragements).
but not with other forms of civic engagement; replicating
the findings of Study 2. In contrast to Study 2 however,
Americans’ perceptions of their compatriots’ self-enhancement
were related only to voting in local elections, and neither type
of perceived values was significantly tied to Americans’ civic
engagement attitudes.
Results in Table 4 also indicated that the more that
people reported believing that their compatriots valued self-
transcendence, the less they reported feeling atypical and like a
misfit. Conversely, the more that people believed others valued
self-enhancement, the more they reported feeling atypical and
like a misfit. These findings replicate Study 2 and again establish
that the path from the predictor to the proposed mediator
is tenable.
Perceived values of others, cultural estrangement, and civic
engagement (H2a-H2d)
In addition, the more estranged people felt, the less civic
engagement they reported. However, as in Study 2, the misfit
subscale did not relate to other civic behaviors.
We next tested themediation hypothesis that feeling estranged
helps to explain the link between perceived values of others
and civic engagement. As in Study 2, both perceived compatriot
self-transcendence and self-enhancement had associations with
both the mediator(s) and outcome that were approximately
equal in size and opposite in direction, allowing us to employ a
difference score. We therefore entered this perceived compatriot
ST-SE difference score as the predictor, voting as the outcome,
and atypical and misfit as simultaneous mediators. Once the
mediators were entered into the model, the association between
perceived others’ ST-SE and voting was reduced from b= 0.017,
SE = 0.009, t(991) = 1.82, p = 0.069, to b = −0.009, SE = 0.010,
t(991) = −0.90, p = 0.367. Of the aspects of estrangement,
both atypical and misfit were unique, significant predictors of
voting, b = −0.066, SE = 0.021, t(991) = −3.20, p = 0.001
and b = −0.072, SE = 0.016, t(991) = −4.63, p < 0.001,
respectively. The bootstrapped indirect effects for atypical,
b = 0.013 [0.005, 0.021] and for misfit, b = 0.013 [0.008, 0.020]
did not contain zero, indicating that both forms of cultural
estrangement mediated the link between voting and perceptions
of others’ values.
Institutional values, cultural estrangement, and civic
engagement (H3a and H3b)
Finally, we conducted the same analyses concerning perceptions
of institutional values that we had done in Study 2. The tests
of the main effects and interactions across dependent variables
are presented in Table 5. Here we highlight three key findings.
First, there was again a strong, negative main effect of perceived
institutional ST-SE on cultural estrangement, replicating Study
2. Second, and unlike Study 2, this effect was not qualified by
a significant interaction between ST-SE and institution type.
Third, there was a significant interaction between perceived
institutional ST-SE and institution type in the prediction of civic
engagement attitudes. This interaction appeared to be driven in
part by the difference in slopes between the arts and culture
and the media conditions, displayed in Figure 1 (right panel).
As arts and culture institutions were perceived to encourage ST-
SE, civic engagement attitudes were more positive, b = 0.136,
SE = 0.051, t(985) = 2.67, p = 0.008, but as media institutions
were perceived to encourage ST-SE, civic engagement attitudes
decreased, b = −0.059, SE = 0.049, t(985) = −1.21, p = 0.223.
Hence, as in Study 2, the perceived promotion of ST-SE by
arts and culture is linked to more positive civic engagement
attitudes, whereas the perceived promotion of these values by the
media has the opposite effect. Finally, although the interaction
was not significant, we present the relations between values
and non-voting engagement behaviors for the media and arts
in Figure 2 (right panel). As is clear in the figure, the patterns
are fairly consistent with those observed in the British sample
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TABLE 5 | Test statistics from predicting cultural estrangement and civic
engagement behaviors and attitudes from perceived values encouraged by
institutions, institution types, and their interaction, Study 3.
F p
OTHER CIVIC ENGAGEMENT BEHAVIOR
Value 3.71 0.054
Institution 0.90 0.466
Value × Institution 0.83 0.505
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT ATTITUDES
Value 3.49 0.062
Institution 2.28 0.059
Value × Institution 4.25 0.002
VOTING
Value 0.25 0.620
Institution 1.06 0.376
Value × institution type 0.48 0.747
CULTURAL ESTRANGEMENT
Value 63.53 <0.001
Institution 1.40 0.232
Value × institution type 1.15 0.330
(Study 2), even though they did not reach significance in this
American sample.
Brief Discussion
The primary aim of Study 3 was to examine to what extent the
patterns we uncovered in a British context between perceived
values of others and civic engagement also held in an American
context. Although some of the relations between perceived values
and civic engagement appeared weaker in the US than in the UK,
there was a considerable amount of overlap between results in
the two samples. For example, the more both Americans and
Brits reported believing their average compatriots valued self-
transcendence, the more they themselves reported voting and the
less they reported feeling culturally estranged.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The studies reported here, which were conducted in large,
nationally representative samples across the UK and US, offer
two main contributions to the existing literature: first, they show
that perceptions of others’ values have a consistent relationship
with civic engagement, and, second, they indicate that cultural
estrangement is a key mechanism that explains this relationship.
These novel findings may have important implications for
the many groups working to increase civic engagement. In some
ways, the presentation of the results so far, with many apparently
small effect sizes, may belie their practical meaning. Here we
illustrate how perceptions are related to odds of voting. As
noted in section Preliminary analysis, the average British citizen
reports being less self-enhancement oriented than they believe
their average compatriot to be, Cohen’s d = 0.68, and in raw
scale values the gap is 0.58 (i.e., from mean self-enhancement
actual = −0.15 and mean self-enhancement perceived = −0.73
in Table 2). Now let us examine the simple case of the prediction
of voting in the national election from perceptions of compatriot
values for self-enhancement. A logistic model of voting by
perceived compatriot self-enhancement reveals an effect of
perceived self-enhancement of −0.46, which means that for
every 1 point increase on the scale of perceived compatriot
self-enhancement, odds of voting decrease by 37% [37 = 1—
exp(−0.46)]. What if the average citizen closed the gap by
bringing their perceptions in line with what others actually self-
report for self-enhancement? That is, what if the average citizen
decreased the perception of self-enhancement by 0.58? The
change in the log odds for closing this gap is given by completing
the logistic equation with intercept and slope above for values of
actual (−0.15) and perceived (−0.73) self-enhancement. The log
odds difference is 0.27, which gives an odds increase for voting of
31%. This, in turn, translates to a 3.4% increase in overall turnout,
or 2.23 million more voters (given the mid-2016 population
estimate of 65.65 million; Office of National Statistics, 2017).
Perception of Others’ Values and
Civic Engagement
Our primary finding, consistent across studies, was that
individuals who thought that self-transcendence was valued by
British culture (Study 1), by “a typical British person” (Study 2),
and by “a typical American person” (Study 3) were more likely to
report having voted in recent elections.
Across these studies, we found evidence that voting is more
positively related to perceived others’ self-transcendence (H1a)
than that it is negatively related to perceived others’ self-
enhancement values (H1b). One possible explanation for why
we see more robust (beneficial) effects of self-transcendence
than (harmful) effects of self-enhancement is that care for
others’ welfare (reflected in self-transcendence values) is a motive
more obviously associated with political and civic engagement
than self-interest (as reflected in self-enhancement values) is
associated with civic disengagement. That is, people might
have a number of different motives for their own political
disengagement, including disillusionment (e.g., “All the parties
sound the same”), low political outcome efficacy (e.g., “My vote
doesn’t count”), and low trust in the electoral and democratic
system (e.g., “The system is rigged”). It could also be the case that
people do not necessarily associate others’ self-interested motives
with disengagement. They might rather assume that their self-
interested compatriots would get civically involved, but just in
the pursuit of selfish rather than group interest. These questions
would be fascinating to explore in future research, as there is
little understanding at present of how individuals’ expectations
of others’ values predict their civic engagement.
A second outcome of interest concerned civic engagement
attitudes, more broadly (that is, not only relevant to voting).
Results for this outcome were rather inconsistent across studies.
Namely, when we measured civic engagement attitudes in
Study 2, we found that the more British participants perceived
other British people to care about self-transcendence, or to not
care about self-enhancement, the more positive their attitudes
were toward civic engagement. However, these findings did
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not hold with American citizens in Study 3. This might be
because the US population is much larger and, arguably,
more politically polarized than the UK. Research suggests that
Americans consistently overestimate polarization in the attitudes
of Democrats vs. Republicans, and they aremore likely to fall prey
to that overestimation if they themselves are politically engaged
(Westfall et al., 2015). When Democrats and Republicans see
themselves as so clearly opposed, the concept of a “typical
compatriot’s values” at a national level may be too broad, or
perhaps too conflicted, to be associated with attitudes toward
civic engagement.
Our hypotheses regarding perceptions of others’ values were
not supported when predicting civic engagement behaviors other
than voting. One possible reason for these different patterns for
voting vs. other forms of civic engagement may be the effort
involved in each type of activity. It does not take much to claim
community is important or to vote during broadly orchestrated
elections. In contrast, many of the behaviors in the measure of
other civic behaviors (e.g., volunteering, demonstrating, donating
money) may require some cost in terms of time, money, or
social reputation.
There might also be some types of civic engagement that
are more likely to be affected by perceptions of others. For
instance, perceptions could play a stronger role in behaviors that
are collective and involve direct interaction with other people,
such as joining a community campaign group, compared to
behaviors that are explicitly solo activities, for example signing an
online petition. It would be a good direction for future research
to explore differences between such sub-classifications of civic
engagement (cf. Corning and Myers, 2002).
Why might perceptions of others’ values be associated
with civic engagement? Considering the link between self-
enhancement and disengagement, we revisit the notion that
where there is a perceived norm of self-interest, people are
motivated to fit in with that (Miller, 1999; Miller and Prentice,
2016). This same norm-following logic can also be marshaled
to explain the reverse (and, as we found, stronger) link between
perceptions of others’ self-transcendence values and engagement:
there is also a strong norm of benevolence in the cultures we
sampled and that may be shared universally (Saucier, 2017), and
people are motivated to act in line with that norm as well.
Of course, it may also be the case that actions influence values.
For example, Bem (1972) proposed that individuals observe
their own behavior and then infer what has caused them to act.
If people observe that they have not voted, for instance, they
might explain this with reference to others’ values, e.g., “I didn’t
vote because I don’t think I’m living in a society where people
care about the welfare of others.” Similarly, Heider’s (1958)
consistency theory might suggest that people change their goals
and values to be consistent with their volitional behavior post
facto. In both of these explanations we assume that behavior is
affected by cues in the environment. Of course, we cannot exclude
other possibilities of causation. It could be that individuals
project their own values onto others and assume, for example,
that if they themselves care about co-operation then other people
must too; this projection may then influence civic engagement,
feelings of cultural estrangement, etc. It could also be that fit
is important, such that outcomes like civic engagement are a
function of the alignment between personal and perceived values
(cf. Bleidorn et al., 2016). We have placed less emphasis on the
projection and fit explanations simply because they are more
difficult to address empirically, not because they are necessarily
less likely. As such, probing the direction(s) of causality for the
associations we observed provides one important and interesting
avenue for future research.
Cultural Estrangement Explains the Link
Between Perceived Values of Others
and Engagement
Few studies have addressed whether the perception of certain
values, in particular, are associated with feelings of estrangement,
often conceptualized as the comparison between one’s own values
and those of society and/or a rejection of dominant values
(Bernard et al., 2006). We reasoned that the perception that
others prioritize the welfare of the group (perceiving others’
self-transcendence values), would be associated with lower
estrangement and the perception that others prioritize self-
interested goals would be associated with higher estrangement.
This hypothesis (H2a) was consistently supported across the
studies. We also found consistent evidence in support of H2b,
that people were less likely to vote if they felt alienated (Study
1), atypical, or like a misfit (Studies 2 and 3). Feeling atypical
(but not like a misfit) was also found to relate negatively to
civic engagements other than voting. Further, our mediational
hypothesis (H2d) was supported, in that feeling atypical (but
not a misfit) helped explain the relationship between perceptions
of compatriots’ values and voting. These findings regarding
atypicality in particular suggest that when individuals feel
themselves to be a stranger, in terms of values, they are more
likely to be disengaged from civic activities.
Taken together, these findings suggest that cultural
estrangement may be an important mechanism by which
perceptions of others’ values are associated with levels of civic
engagement. If people not only perceive others to be relatively
high in self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement, but also feel
that they are themselves fairly typical of their national values
(as captured by lower scores on cultural estrangement), then
perhaps they will be more likely to vote.
Perceptions of Institutions’ Values Are Also
Linked to Civic Engagement
Along with exploring the consequences of perceiving other
individuals’ values, we also explored value perceptions regarding
five types of institutions: arts and culture, education, government,
media, and business.
As far as we know, no study has looked at the perceptions
of the values that are encouraged by large, national, cultural
institutions, nor how those perceptions might relate to civic
engagement, yet these kinds of perceptions are fascinating
reflections of how people view the societies in which they
live. Although there was no general relationship between civic
engagement and perceptions of the values that institutions in
general promote, some significant results were evidenced for
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certain institutions. Specifically, civic engagement was positively
associated with perceived promotion of self-transcendence by
arts and culture institutions but negatively correlated with
perceived promotion of self-transcendence by the media. These
patterns might suggest that people are sensitive to a type of
institutional value fit, such that when institutions are perceived
as promoting certain expected values, civic engagement is higher.
Though speculative and abstract, arts and culture institutions
may be more likely to talk with the public in public spaces,
rely on participation by community members, and “cross-
promote” other community goings-on. Thus, this might explain
why a perceived self-transcendent message from the arts is
associated with greater civic involvement. In contrast, the media
may be more likely to talk at the public in intrusive ways,
inspire interindividual competition, and crowd out community
with self-enhancement-promoting commercials. Thus, a self-
enhancement message from the media would similarly seem to
follow from the other tendencies associated with the institution,
and a self-transcendent message would seem hypocritical.
Limitations and Avenues for
Future Research
One limitation of the present research arises from the
retrospective self-report methodology we used to assess civic
behaviors. In the absence of observed civic behavior or
participant-matched voting data, we cannot know for certain that
our participants were as civically engaged as they said. In general,
however, it does not appear that socially desirable responding
provides an alternative explanation for the results we observed
(see footnote 2).
A significant limitation of the present set of studies, as alluded
to in section Perception of Others’ Values and Civic Engagement,
is that the causality question remains unresolved: Do perceptions
of others’ values lead to civic engagement, or is some other
causal pathway involved? We argue that these two variables
are likely to have mutual influence on one another (possibly
in a feedback loop), but this proposal requires an empirical
investigation beyond the scope of this paper.
In the future, researchers could explore potential causal
relationships between perceptions of others’ values and civic
engagement through experimental research where one or the
other variable is manipulated (see section Cultural Estrangement
Explains the Link Between Perceived Values of Others and
Engagement). Ideally such studies would be conducted with
samples of the general public or with specific types of
organizations working to increase civic engagement. A research
team in New Zealand (Harré et al., 2017) has suggested that
people seeking social change tend to carry a so-called “tale of
terror” about the values of their compatriots (i.e., that they care
most about materialism, success, and status), but that this can be
transformed to a “tale of hope” if people reflect instead that their
compatriots value the common good. Harré et al. (2017) similarly
suggest that campaigners will be more hopeful and therefore
more effective if they can change their assumptions about what
other people value.
Future research could also address the role of political
ideology in the relationship between perceptions of others’
values and different civic engagement outcomes. In the present
paper we have measured a range of general civic outcomes,
such as voting and demonstrating, that can encompass either
conservative or liberal behaviors. Further, statistical control of
demographic variables in the present data suffers from the issues
outlined in the Appendix. Although it is a strength of this paper
that we show connections between perceived values and civic
outcomes, regardless of political ideology (as in Schwartz, 2010;
Vecchione et al., 2015), this is a research avenue that deserves
more attention, especially in disentangling how ideology informs
values and vice versa.
It also remains to be seen whether these results would
generalize beyond the two countries studied here. The US and
UK have many cultural similarities and shared political histories,
factors that could drive similar patterns among perceived
values and civic engagement that may not hold outside of
that particular cultural and historical/political overlap. In fact,
within Europe, personally-held self-transcendence values are a
significant predictor of political participation in countries with
relatively old democratic traditions (e.g., Sweden) but not in post-
socialist countries whose democratization is relatively recent
(Slovenia and the Czech Republic; Fink, 2012). The relations
between perceptions of others’ values and civic engagement, then,
might also vary by age and type of a nation’s democracy, and
should be explored in future research.
Another avenue for cross-cultural research is the question of
if and why people systematically misperceive others as caring less
about self-transcendence and more about self-enhancement than
they do themselves. The literature on values discrepancy to date
would seem to support the notion that this basic misperception
is widespread, as it has previously been reported in Estonia
(Dobewall and Strack, 2011), the UK (Bernard et al., 2006) and
Russia (Lönnqvist et al., 2012).
In addition, it would be interesting to collect large enough
samples to determine the relative incremental ability of one’s own
personal values and one’s perceptions of others’ values (and of
cultural institutions’ values) to predict outcomes. As noted in the
Appendix, our current samples and measures were insufficient
for this sort of analysis, but future projects could address this
important question. In general, research should continue to
examine the basic psychometric properties of the construct
of perceived values of others and institutions. In the present
work, multidimensional scaling indicated that perceived values
may be structured quite similarly to personal values, and factor
analysis provided preliminary evidence for distinct constructs.
The convergent and discriminant validity of these constructs
remains an especially important question for future research.
Similarly, future research should seek to replicate the finding that
estrangement may explain the perceived values-engagement link
in light of the high potential for error-prone conclusions in the
current study.
Implications
Civic engagement is both a symptom and a driver of democratic
processes and societal change. Whatever a citizen’s definition of
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 March 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 559
Sanderson et al. Value Perceptions and Civic Engagement
“better” may be, becoming civically engaged is fundamental to
moving toward that ideal of a better society. Civic engagement
is also fundamental to how many policy makers, politicians, and
campaigners see change, i.e., that big and pressing issues such as
climate change and economic justice will only be addressed if
there is mass public participation, because top-down decision-
making or technological solutions are insufficient (Common
Cause Foundation, 2016).
Most of the research to date on civic engagement
and values has focused on how personal value priorities
relate to civic engagement (Schwartz, 2010; Pacheco
and Owen, 2015; Vecchione et al., 2015). The present
research indicates that perceptions of others’ values
also relate to voting and civic attitudes. These findings
suggest that campaigners and policymakers might find
it useful to encourage belief in the (accurate) norm
that most people actually do care about the welfare
of others more than self-interest; such a strategy
could be implemented instead of or in addition to
reminding people of their own self-transcendence values
(Common Cause Foundation, 2016).
The present studies point to new avenues for research
into the source of the “value-action gap” (e.g., Maio, 2010;
see also Burford et al., 2015), which is the fact that abstract
value priorities are not always associated with the behavioral
outcomes one would expect to flow out of those values. It
may be that, if people feel that their social environment affords
them, via resources and support, opportunities to express self-
transcendence values, then they may feel inclined to engage
in actions consistent with their own self-transcendence values,
e.g., to become civically involved. If, however, they feel that
expression of their own self-transcendence values will be
rebuffed by their environment, they may opt to not engage in
behaviors consistent with their values. This raises the intriguing
possibility that people who prioritize self-enhancement values
might be more likely to act on their (presumably, relatively
weak) self-transcendence values if they think they are living
in an environment where these values can be expressed
relatively easily.
Though still speculative, the applications of these results for
policymakers and electoral campaigners are potentially deeper
than simply encouraging people to believe in more accurate
value norms. Instead, the results suggest that supporting and
encouraging people’s existing self-transcendence values could
help to narrow the self-transcendence value-action gap. While
such encouragement would presumably reduce feelings of
cultural estrangement, another route would be to work on
reducing estrangement directly and, in particular, the feeling
of being atypical. On a national level this is clearly no mean
feat, but one avenue for campaigners would be to be more
explicit, through rhetoric and policies, of the ways in which
the diversity of citizens is acknowledged and included. The
concept of nationalism in both Britain and America has become
increasingly associated with tribalism based on ethnic or class
groups, and often for these reasons rejected by most but far-right
political parties and citizens alike. It seems a healthy democracy
might depend on building a widespread feeling among citizens
that they belong in the civic group (i.e., the nation) enough to
take part in civic matters.
We hope that other researchers continue the
investigation of others’ perceived values and cultural
estrangement and the roles they may play in
potentially important societal, interpersonal, and
intrapersonal processes.
ETHICS STATEMENT
Study 1
The Cardiff University School of Psychology ethics committee
approved analysis of data (EC.15.04.14.4133R), and external
organization YouGov followed recommendations for data
collection with human subjects provided by the Framework for
Research Ethics (FRE) as outlined by the Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC), and in compliance with the Data
Protection Act, 1998. Participants gave their informed consent
to take part in the study, in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki.
Studies 2 and 3
Ipsos MORI collected data in full compliance with the
ICC/ESOMAR Code of Conduct, the Data Protection Act 1998
and national research industry codes of conduct in the UK and
USA (the Market Research Society and CASRO, respectively).
Participants first completed informed consent and were assured
of the confidentiality of their responses and their right to
withdraw, in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
RS led the preparation of this manuscript and designed,
managed and supported the analysis of data in Studies 2 and
3. MP co-wrote this manuscript and led the analysis and
reporting of data for all studies. LW and NW supported the
design and analysis of Study 1 and provided feedback on the
manuscript. TK and TC advised on the design, analysis, and
interpretation of Studies 2 and 3, and provided feedback on
the manuscript.
FUNDING
Studies 2 and 3 were supported through a grant from WWF-
UK, The Living Planet Centre, Rufford House, Brewery Road,
Woking, UK.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank Professor Greg Maio, Department of
Psychology, University of Bath, UK for helpful discussion of
key ideas.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 15 March 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 559
Sanderson et al. Value Perceptions and Civic Engagement
REFERENCES
Baker, W. E. (2005). America’s Crisis of Values: Reality and Perception. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bardi, A., and Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Values and behavior: strength
and structure of relations. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 29, 1207–1220.
doi: 10.1177/0146167203254602
Baron, R. M., and Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable
distinction in social psychological research: conceptual, strategic,
and statistical considerations. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 51, 1173–1182.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1173
Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 6, 1–62.
doi: 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60024-6
Bernard, M. M., Gebauer, J. E., and Maio, G. R. (2006). Cultural estrangement: the
role of personal and societal value discrepancies. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 32,
78–92. doi: 10.1177/0146167205279908
Bleidorn, W., Schönbrodt, F., Gebauer, J. E., Rentfrow, P. J., Potter, J., and
Gosling, S. D. (2016). To live among like-minded others: exploring the links
between person-city personality fit and self-esteem. Psychol. Sci. 27, 419–427.
doi: 10.1177/0956797615627133
Bobbio, A., and Manganelli, A. M. (2011). Measuring social desirability
responding. A short version of Paulhus’ BIDR 6. TPM-Test. Psychometr.
Methodolo. Appl. Psychol. 18, 117–135. doi: 10.4473/TPM.18.2.4
Boer, D., and Fischer, R. (2013). How and when do personal values guide our
attitudes and sociality? Explaining cross-cultural variability in attitude–value
linkages. Psychol. Bull. 139:1113–1147. doi: 10.1037/a0031347
Burford, G., Hoover, E., Dahl, A., and Harder, M. K. (2015). “Making the invisible
visible: designing values-based indicators and tools for identifying and closing
‘value-action gaps’,” in Responsible Living, eds V. Thoresen, D. Doyle, J. Klein,
and R. Didham (Basel: Springer International Publishing), 113–133.
Cable, D. M., and Edwards, J. R. (2004). Complementary and supplementary
fit: a theoretical and empirical integration. J. Appl. Psychol. 89, 822–834.
doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.89.5.822
Caprara, G. V., Vecchione, M., and Schwartz, S. H. (2012). Why people do not
vote. Eur. Psychol. 17, 266–278. doi: 10.1027/1016-9040/a000099
Cialdini, R. B., Kallgren, C. A., and Reno, R. R. (1991). A focus theory
of normative conduct: a theoretical refinement and reevaluation of the
role of norms in human behavior. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 24, 201–234.
doi: 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60330-5
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychol. Bull. 112, 155–159.
doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.112.1.155
Common Cause Foundation (2016). Perceptions Matter: The Common Cause UK
Values Survey. London: Common Cause Foundation.
Corning, A. F., and Myers, D. J. (2002). Individual orientation toward engagement
in social action. Polit. Psychol. 23, 703–729. doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00304
Cozzarelli, C., and Karafa, J. A. (1998). Cultural estrangement and
terror management theory. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 24, 253–267.
doi: 10.1177/0146167298243003
Crompton, T. (2010). Common Cause: The Case for Working With Our Cultural
Values. Godalming: WWF-UK.
Daniel, E., Bilgin, A. S., Brezina, I., Strohmeier, C. E., and Vainre, M. (2015). Values
and helping behavior: a study in four cultures. Int. J. Psychol. 50, 186–192.
doi: 10.1002/ijop.12086
Dobewall, H., and Strack, M. (2011). Cultural value differences, value stereotypes,
and diverging identities in intergroup conflicts: the Estonian example. Int. J.
Conf. Viol. 5, 211–223. doi: 10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.73
Doolittle, A., and Faul, A. C. (2013). Civic engagement scale: a validation study.
Sage Open 3, 1–7. doi: 10.1177/2158244013495542
Edwards, J. R. (2002). “Alternatives to difference scores: polynomial regression
analysis and response surface methodology,” in The Jossey-Bass Business &
Management Series. Measuring and Analyzing Behavior in Organizations:
Advances in Measurement and Data Analysis, eds F. Drasgow and N. Schmitt
(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass), 350–400.
Edwards, J. R., and Cable, D. M. (2009). The value of value congruence. J. Appl.
Psychol. 94, 654–677. doi: 10.1037/a0014891
Fink, M. H. (2012). Political participation, democratisation and citizens’ values in
Europe. Teorija Praksa 49, 544–565. Available online at: https://www.fdv.uni-
lj.si/en/journals/science-journals/teorija-in-praksa
Hackett, J. D., and Omoto, A. M. (2009). Efficacy and estrangement:
effects of voting. Anal. Soc. Issues Public Policy 9, 297–314.
doi: 10.1111/j.1530-2415.2009.01192.x
Harré, N., Madden, H., Brooks, R., and Goodman, J. (2017). Sharing values
as a foundation for collective hope. J. Soc. Polit. Psychol. 5, 342–366.
doi: 10.5964/jspp.v5i2.742
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional
Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach. New York, NY: The
Guilford Press.
Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York, NY:
John Wiley.
Karp, D. G. (1996). Values and their effect on pro-environmental behavior.
Environ. Behav. 28, 111–133. doi: 10.1177/0013916596281006
Kasser, T., Cohn, S., Kanner, A. D., and Ryan, R.M. (2007). Some costs of American
corporate capitalism: a psychological exploration of value and goal conflicts.
Psychol. Inq. 18, 1–22. doi: 10.1080/10478400701386579
Kasser, T., and Linn, S. (2016). Growing up under corporate capitalism: the
problem of marketing to children, with suggestions for policy solutions. Soc.
Issues Policy Rev. 10, 122–150. doi: 10.1111/sipr.12020
Liberman, V., Samuels, S. M., and Ross, L. (2004). The name of the game:
predictive power of reputations versus situational labels in determining
prisoner’s dilemma game moves. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 30, 1175–1185.
doi: 10.1177/0146167204264004
Lönnqvist, J., Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., and Verkasalo, M. (2012). Accuracy and contrast
in national value stereotypes – a Case study using Ingrian-Finns as bi-cultural
experts. Int. J. Intercult. Relat. 36, 271–278. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2011.08.002
Maio, G. R. (2010). Mental representations of social values. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol.
42, 1–43. doi: 10.1016/S0065-2601(10)42001-8
Maio, G. R., Pakizeh, A., Cheung,W. Y., and Rees, K. J. (2009). Changing, priming,
and acting on values: effects via motivational relations in a circular model. J.
Pers. Soc. Psychol. 97, 699–715. doi: 10.1037/a0016420
Miller, D. T. (1999). The norm of self-interest. Am. Psychol. 54, 1053–1060.
doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.54.12.1053
Miller, D. T., and Prentice, D. A. (2016). Changing norms to change behavior.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 67, 339–361. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015013
Office of National Statistics (2017). Population Estimates for the UK, England and
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2016. Available online at: https://
www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/
populationestimates/bulletins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/mid2016#
population-of-england-reaches-55-million
Pacheco, G., and Owen, B. (2015). Moving through the political participation
hierarchy: a focus on personal values. Appl. Econ. 47, 222–238.
doi: 10.1080/00036846.2014.967384
Prentice, M., and Sheldon, K. M. (2015). Priming effects on cooperative behavior
in social dilemmas: considering the prime and the person. J. Soc. Psychol. 155,
163–181. doi: 10.1080/00224545.2014.977763
Ros, M., Schwartz, S. H., and Surkiss, S. (1999). Basic individual values,
work values, and the meaning of work. Appl. Psychol. 48, 49–71.
doi: 10.1111/j.1464-0597.1999.tb00048.x
Rousseau, J. (1751). Discourse on the Sciences and Arts. London: Owen.
Sagiv, L., Sverdlik, N., and Schwarz, N. (2011). To compete or to cooperate? Values’
impact on perception and action in social dilemma games. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.
41, 64–77. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.729
Sanderson, R., andMcQuilkin, J. (2017). “Many kinds of kindness: the relationship
between values and prosocial behaviour,” in Values and Behavior: Taking
a Cross-Cultural Perspective, eds S. Roccas and L. Sagiv (Basel: Springer
International Publishing), 75–96.
Saucier, G. (2017). “Value hierarchies within and across cultures: a comparative
test of 25 value theories,” in Paper Presented at the 5th Biennial Conference of
the Association for Research in Personality (Sacramento, CA).
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: theoretical
advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 25, 1–65.
doi: 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of
human values? J. Soc. Issues 50, 19–45. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01196.x
Schwartz, S. H. (2003). A proposal for measuring value orientations across nations.
Quest. Dev. Pack. Eur. Soc. Survey 7, 259–290. Available online at: http://www.
europeansocialsurvey.org
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 16 March 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 559
Sanderson et al. Value Perceptions and Civic Engagement
Schwartz, S. H. (2010). “Basic values: how they motivate and inhibit prosocial
behavior,” in Prosocial Motives, Emotions, and Behavior: The Better Angels of
Our Nature, eds M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver (Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association), 221–241.
Schwartz, S. H. (2012). An overview of the Schwartz theory of basic values. Online
Read. Psychol. Cult. 2:11. doi: 10.9707/2307-0919.1116
Schwartz, S. H., Melech, G., Lehmann, A., Burgess, S., and Harris, M. (2001).
Extending the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human values
with a different method of measurement. J. Cross Cult. Psychol. 32, 519–542.
doi: 10.1177/0022022101032005001
Schwartz, S. H., and Sagie, G. (2000). Value consensus and importance:
a cross-national study. J. Cross Cult. Psychol. 31, 465–497.
doi: 10.1177/0022022100031004003
Schwartz, S. H., Struch, N., and Bilsky, W. (1990). Values and intergroup social
motives: a study of Israeli and German students. Soc. Psychol. Q. 53, 185–198.
doi: 10.2307/2786958
Skimina, E., and Cieciuch, J. (2017). Value structure and priorities: other-report
account. Curr. Issues Pers. Psychol. 6, 252–259. doi: 10.5114/cipp.2018.72259
Stokols, D. (1975). Toward a psychological theory of alienation. Psychol. Rev. 82,
26–44. doi: 10.1037/h0076230
Strauss, J. P., Sawyerr, O. O., and Oke, A. (2008). Demographics, individual value
structures, and diversity attitudes in the United Kingdom. J. Change Manag. 8,
147–170. doi: 10.1080/14697010701799445
Vecchione, M., Schwartz, S. H., Caprara, G. V., Schoen, H., Cieciuch, J., Silvester,
J., et al. (2015). Personal values and political activism: a cross-national study.
Br. J. Psychol. 106, 84–106. doi: 10.1111/bjop.12067
Westfall, J., Van Boven, L., Chambers, J. R., and Judd, C. M. (2015). Perceiving
political polarization in the United States: party identity strength and attitude
extremity exacerbate the perceived partisan divide. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 10,
145–158. doi: 10.1177/1745691615569849
Westfall, J., and Yarkoni, T. (2016). Statistically controlling for confounding
constructs is harder than you think. PLoS ONE 11:e0152719.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0152719
Conflict of Interest Statement: RS, MP, LW, NW and TK declare that this work
has been carried out without personal, professional, or financial relationships that
could potentially be construed as a conflict of interest. TC works for the Common
Cause Foundation, which secured the funding for collecting Studies 2 and 3.
Copyright © 2019 Sanderson, Prentice, Wolf, Weinstein, Kasser and Crompton.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums
is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited
and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted
academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not
comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 17 March 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 559
Sanderson et al. Value Perceptions and Civic Engagement
APPENDIX
Appendix: On Pursuing Tests of Incremental Validity for Self
and Perceptions of Others’ Values
As noted in the introduction, readers might expect that
we tested our main hypotheses after controlling for ratings of
personally-held self-enhancement and self-transcendence values.
We did not do so, however, for the following reasons.
In general, regression-based tests of unique prediction
via simultaneous competitions for variance are fraught with
inferential landmines. This is because “measurement unreliability
and model misspecification will often have a deleterious and
large effect on parameter estimates (and associated error rates)
when covariates are entered into regression-based models.
Consequently, under realistic assumptions, it can be shown that
a large proportion of incremental validity claims in many
disciplines are likely to be false” (Westfall and Yarkoni, 2016,
p. 2; emphasis added). Said differently, in most realistic cases of
regression-based analyses of incremental validity, the researcher
runs a serious risk of conclusion errors, often via misattributing
effects in regression-basedmodels. If we were to conduct analyses
testing whether, for example, perceptions of others’ values added
unique prediction of civic engagement after controlling for one’s
own personal values, we might mistakenly conclude evidence
for the presence of incremental validity. Conversely, we might
mistakenly conclude that perceived values of others do not have
incremental validity over and above personally-held values. In
the former case, we would be making a faulty assertion of
incremental validity. In the latter, we might not pursue the results
further because they would appear to lack novelty.
The key problem is that both problematic conclusions are
often more likely than claims to either incremental or non-
incremental validity that are sound. The key question is does
the present research situation fit the profile for a case that is
likely to lead to problematic conclusions? As readers will notice
when reading the methods sections of Studies 2 and 3, we
have large samples and conventionally acceptable measurement
reliabilities, conditions that seem conducive to drawing sound
conclusions from incremental tests via regression. However, it is
under these conditions that researchers are often most likely to
misattribute effects of simultaneous predictors in an attempt to
make arguments for predictive utility (i.e., that there is an effect
of a predictor even after controlling for a potential confound):
“even at a conventionally acceptable reliability of 0.7 or 0.8, the
[Type I] error rate can still be extremely high if the sample
size and/or indirect effect are large. The non-monotonic effect
of reliability has a compound explanation that becomes clear
when one considers each extreme separately. When reliability is
very low . . . it becomes almost impossible to detect any effect.
Conversely, when reliability is very high, the model is able to
avoid misattributing the effect of the covariate to the predictor
of interest. In the middle, however, there exists a territory where
effects are large enough to afford detection, but reliability is too
low to prevent misattribution.” (Westfall and Yarkoni, 2016, p. 5).
Similarly, in the present case, a related but different claim
to be made on the basis of modeling is that self and
other values are separately contributing constructs when they
are both significant predictors in a simultaneous regression.
Unfortunately, the statistical characteristics that make the
argument for predictive utility so error prone, and that hold
in the present case, largely hold for the separate contributions
claim as well, and the error rate for this claim approaches
100% as sample sizes increase with modest reliabilities of
0.7–0.8 and small to moderate predictor intercorrelation
(i.e., r = 0.3–0.5; cf. Figure 4A; Westfall and Yarkoni,
2016).
We can compute the probabilities for drawing
conclusions about our parameters in an incremental
test based on our observed correlations and reliabilities
with the use of the incremental validity error rate
calculator (“Ivy”) provided by Westfall and Yarkoni (2016;
https://jakewestfall.shinyapps.io/ivy_app/). To take just one
example, for self-enhancement values in Study 2, the probability
of concluding both predictors have an effect is 74%, but this value
includes the error rate that is inflated well over conventionally
accepted levels of 5% and is likely over 50% (Figure 4A; Westfall
and Yarkoni, 2016). In short, the large sizes of the current
samples work counterintuitively in concert with the measured
characteristics (i.e., the reliabilities and zero-order correlations)
in ways that make confident conclusions that effects on voting
are “just” because of perceptions, or “just” because of personal
values, or are actually due to separate contributions of the two
variables, highly error-prone.
The astute reader might further suspect that the situation
could be improved by moving from regression to SEM, thereby
accounting for measurement error. Unfortunately that is not the
case presently. As the simulations in Westfall and Yarkoni (2016)
demonstrate, we would need N = 1,600 (given our observed
reliabilities) to have 80% power for detecting unique incremental
effects (i.e., partial correlations) of 0.10, nearly as large as any
incremental effect could be given the zero-order correlation
patterns in Studies 2 and 3. The zero order correlations make
it clear that we should not expect incremental effects of even
that magnitude, given that those associations between predictors
and voting are around or below 0.10 (cf. Figure 12B; Westfall
and Yarkoni, 2016). In fact, N = 1,600 is a low value more
reflective of the optimistic case for self-transcendence values,
which are less-strongly correlated between self and perceived
variables than self and perceived are for self-enhancement values.
The situation for Study 3 is not substantially improved given
the smaller zero order effects despite some slight gains in
reliability overall.
In sum, are we justified inmaking the argument that perceived
values are predictive of voting beyond the effect of personal
values? No. However, we have not advanced that argument. Thus,
we make no claims to incremental validity for perceived vs. self-
values in the current paper, as we do not want to put ourselves in
the position of making errant claims for or against incremental
validity given the limits of the current studies for addressing
such questions well. We do believe, however, that the project
holds the possibility of providing incremental knowledge if it can
demonstrate new types of relationships among the variables we
explore.
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